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This is the story of the world
on the brink of economic disaster.

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The most intense period in the crisis
was that period in the fall of 2008.

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There was an extraordinary loss of
confidence, a panic I'd call it.

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The state of the financial markets
was, was very critical indeed.

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It'll be for others to judge just how
on the edge many institutions were.

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A crisis that had been triggered by
the collapse of Lehman Brothers bank

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was now spreading to
every country in the world.

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Financial institutions, banks,
bankers, traders were at a loss.

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And they were not only holding out
their hand, but also,

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you know, turning to us to say,
what are we going to do?

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We need help.

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No government was ready
for the consequences.

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This is the inside account of the
arguments, mistakes and hesitations

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that dramatically
worsened the crisis.

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I didn't feel that we'd be
dumb enough to let the misfunction

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of the financial engine bring down
the country, but there was a time
there where you wondered about that.

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Now, decision-makers in the world's
capitals tell how close we really
came to total financial meltdown.

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I know the counterfactual is very
hard to prove, but it does
make my blood run cold.

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We literally thought that we were
on the verge of the great depression

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and, looking back,
I think we probably were.

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I was in no doubt that the burden
on our shoulders, that the gravity

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of the task we faced,
it's probably the worst situation,
as I say, we faced in peacetime.

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September is hurricane season
in America.

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On Monday, the 15th,
Texas took stock of the damage
caused by the latest, Hurricane Ike.

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These storms are devastating,
but not unusual.

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What was unexpected was the scale of
economic disaster that was coming.

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This is really stupendous
this has happened.

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That same day, Lehman Brothers bank
went bust.

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It was the start of a month

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when the world came within hours
of catastrophe.

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A lot of people expected it,
and others were simply devastated.

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This is an event like a hurricane,
it's unanticipated,

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I don't think any of us were smart
enough to see it

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and, you know, that's unfortunate.

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It was the biggest bankruptcy
in history.

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It sent stockmarkets into a nosedive
and the media into a frenzy.

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Something of a financial hurricane...
A financial tsunami...

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One of the ugliest days
I have ever seen...

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..de la banque Lehman Brothers
sur la finance mondiale...

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Nightmare on Wall St...

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Very, very bad...

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SHE SPEAKS GERMAN

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A day of turmoil on
the world's financial markets.

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The two capitals of international
finance were especially hard hit.

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In New York the Dow
fell a record 504 points.

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The FTSE lost £51 billion in value.

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The dramatic numbers and anguished
faces on Wall Street and the City
were the obvious effect.

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But, the events set in motion
that day would have an impact far
beyond these financial districts.

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The amount banks charged each other
for short term loans doubled
overnight.

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That meant they couldn't
afford to borrow money.

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Banks lost confidence in banks.

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The essence of a bank is confidence.

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If people don't have
complete confidence in a bank,

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the bank won't be able to borrow
the funds which it needs to lend to
others in business, or to families.

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So, that confidence was
at threat and after

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the failure of Lehman Brothers,
it ebbed away very quickly.

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It was the Lehman's collapse
that really burst the dam which
had been building up all summer.

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A 20-year global boom was over.

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All summer, banks around the
world had been haemorrhaging money,

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But Lehman Brothers
was the first to go.

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Lehman's failure made things
dramatically worse.

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Coming into the fall, you had
a global financial crisis

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that was accelerating momentum,

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had tremendous force at that point.

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And that's what's
ultimately caused that failure.

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Lehman made things worse though,
there's no doubt about that.

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That Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday
were really a blur for me because,

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we were all working so hard,
looking at every tool we had,

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seeing where the fires were.

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Dozens of institutions
were in trouble.

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The man running US economic policy
during the crisis
was Treasury secretary Hank Paulson.

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He seemed to change
America's policy day by day.

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He had just refused to
bail out Lehman Brothers,

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but a week earlier spent 200
billion nationalising America's
huge mortgage holding companies.

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He spent 30 billion in March
to save a bank called Bear Stearns.

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Good afternoon, everyone,

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and I hope you all had
an enjoyable weekend.

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MILD LAUGHTER

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No wonder the public was confused.

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Yes, you.

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Why did you agree to support
the bail-out of Bear Stearns
but not Lehman?

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The situation in March
and the facts around Bear Stearns

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were very, very different

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to the situation we're looking at
here in September.

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And I never once considered
that it was appropriate to put
taxpayer money on the line

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in resolving Lehman Brothers.

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But a day later, Tuesday the 16th,
the policy changed again.

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The government spent 85 billion
saving insurance giant AIG.

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If the policy-makers didn't seem
to know what to do,

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how could the public hope to
understand the complexities

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of banking and bail-outs
now coming at them?

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And if I may,
a sincere congratulations

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to everybody out there
who pays taxes in the United States.

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We just bought an insurance company!

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CHEERING AND APPLAUSE

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Congratulations! AIG!

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We own 80% of the world's
biggest insurance company now,

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causing day three
of the nationwide outbreak

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of huge banner
headlines nobody understands.

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Oh, my God, that huge number is
attacking that three letter acronym.

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It was like a slow moving
train wreck.

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On Monday morning,
lots of people woke up and said,

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"Well, that's not so bad."

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By Wednesday, the money market
complex was under threat
and suddenly people realised

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this is something we're going to
be talking to our kids and our
grandkids for a long, long time.

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What happened on Wednesday,
three days into the crisis,
was unprecedented in modern times.

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The lubricant of the economy, the
stable flow of US dollars, froze.

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And not just in America.

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TRANSLATION: They said there were
trillions and trillions of dollars

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crossing the ocean, and suddenly
these dollars disappeared.

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You no longer had credit
in the world

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and this had, even in Brazil,
disastrous consequences.

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Lending between banks
had already shut down.

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And big businesses, like banks
also need to borrow large amounts
of money for very short periods.

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They use a kind of special
IOU called "commercial paper".

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By Wednesday, the Lehman's
aftershock was closing
the commercial paper market.

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We'd been witnessing, for the last
two days, a sequential freezing
of market after market,

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deemed to be absolutely critical
to the functioning of
the capital system.

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I remember picking up the
phone and saying, "Jamie,

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"drop what you're doing,
go to the ATM and take money out,
take the maximum 500 we can".

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And she said, "Why? Why?"
I said, "Because I'm not sure the
banks will be open tomorrow".

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I closed all my savings bank accounts
today because I'll earn more with
Lincoln money market savings.

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Now I can do all my
banking with Lincoln.

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Since the 1980s, Americans had
been encouraged to put their savings
in money market funds.

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Lincoln's new money market savings.

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These funds then lent this cash
to banks and big businesses.

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Lehman Brothers had been
a key player in this trade.

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It collapsed owing almost 800
million to a money market fund
called the Reserve Primary.

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Caught short of cash as a result,
the Reserve Primary told its
depositors they would lose money.

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It's something that the text
books just never contemplate.

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Which is the, the most
safe and secure assets having

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market participants look at them
and say, "these aren't safe,
we're not going to touch them".

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Depositors withdrew 300 billion
from the money market funds.

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It threatened huge companies
that rely on short-term loans
for their day to day cash flow.

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There was an enormous amount of
fear and anxiety as to what we

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were going to do, because

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money market mutual funds
are one of the biggest providers
of cash to all these large

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institutions in the country and,
essentially, in the world.

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It all happened incredibly fast.

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By Wednesday,
only three days into the crisis,

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credit for any institution,
large or small, was unavailable.

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The crisis had entered a
new and dangerous phase.

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Bank CEO's are saying
the inter-bank funding
market is essentially seized up,

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something they've never seen before
in their 40-year histories
of being on the Street.

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Not just banks and commercial banks,

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we were getting calls from
large American businesses,

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Blue Chip Businesses, saying,
they couldn't fund themselves.

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They couldn't make their payroll
or fund their inventory.

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These are some of the best American
companies, that have very little to

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do with financial markets, saying
they can't access basic funding
needed to pay employees.

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It's fair to say
there's a lot of panic.

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That's when we knew
the time had come,

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For the first three days
after Lehman Brothers fell,

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governments had responded
to problems as they came up.

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The UK's banks had been suffering
since the fall of Northern Rock
a year earlier.

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Lehmans accelerated the process.

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We knew that we had...

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..banks collapsing around the world,
we knew that we had very little time.

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The next to go was HBOS.

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On Wednesday, the government
stepped to help broker its sale
to Lloyds TSB for £12 billion.

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There was no confidence within
the system now that people knew

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exactly what was wrong with
each individual bank,

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did you not have to go further?

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Gordon Brown and his city advisor,
Baroness Vadera, saw Britain might

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have to take on the job
of rescuing the financial system.

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Their plan, when it came,
would profoundly alter the story.

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But America got there first.

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The problem facing banks everywhere
were huge bundles of mortgages

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they'd bought and traded
during the boom.

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These were the so-called
"toxic assets".

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Banks borrowed money to buy them.

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It's called "leverage".

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They increase leverage dramatically
in a way that people can't even

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measure, either as the individual
institutions or as to the system,

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but it's dramatic nevertheless.

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Leverage does increase
profits in good times,

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but leverage also worsens losses.

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When property prices crashed,
so did the value of these assets.

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But they were so complex, it was
almost impossible for the banks
to price them or sell them off.

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And banks all over the world
had huge loans that still
had to be paid.

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Banks couldn't raise enough money,

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because they couldn't raise enough
money they had to sell assets.

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They sold those,
asset prices went down,

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had to sell more , because they
lost the capital and so it went on.

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They haven't got enough
capital, they hadn't got enough

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liquidity and they were also
having difficulty raising funds.

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By late on Wednesday afternoon,
three days after Lehman fell,

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the US Treasury decided to
tackle the problem head on.

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We really came up with,
with four main options.

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One was to buy the assets,
buy the toxic assets from the banks,

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the second was to insure the assets,
the third was

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to actually just inject capital,
to buy stakes in financial firms
directly.

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Then, the fourth was, let's just
bail out all the home owners.

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The problem with all these options
was the price tag.

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All would cost over half a trillion
dollars and they needed the support

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of the President and legal authority
from the US congress.

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There was a conference call
to discuss these options.

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It must have been at one or two
in the morning - as Wednesday
night turned into Thursday morning.

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That Thursday morning, 18 September,
Paulson and his Treasury team

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decided to ask the President to
support a plan to buy the
toxic assets from the banks.

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That afternoon,
they went to the White House.

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The President was less interested in
what does the plan exactly look
like, he was more interested in,

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what are the broad strokes
of the authority you need,
why do we need this authority?

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We were in that situation
right then, the question is

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should we take action which,
after the fact,

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might have been unnecessary and
create some problems down the road?

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Or, should we simply not take
action, hope that things work out,
but if they don't and we end up

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in the Great Depression,
the costs of having gone
that path would be extreme.

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The President approved the plan to
ask Congress to pass an emergency

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bill giving the treasury authority
to buy up the toxic assets.

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The news leaked almost instantly.

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I've just got a wire here
that says that Hank Paulson

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and Ben Bernanke are about to meet
people on Capitol Hill,
the lawmakers here,

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to talk about that. We don't know
for definite that it's sure.

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It was sure. An hour later America's
Central Bank Chairman, Ben Bernanke

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and Hank Paulson called on the most
powerful politicians in Washington.

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And that we have a financial
crisis in our country,

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that we're here to work together for
solutions that resolve that crisis...

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We didn't know what they were
going to say. What they said was,

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"Our intervention in AIG
has staved off disaster,

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but not for a very long time".

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Secretary Paulson said
that if he didn't get

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proper authorities within 48 hours,
the banking system would collapse,

224
00:16:04,880 --> 00:16:08,960
and everybody just sort of looked
at him, like he wasn't serious.

225
00:16:08,960 --> 00:16:12,880
And then he turned to Chairman
Bernanke and Chairman
Bernanke said that if

226
00:16:12,880 --> 00:16:17,720
Secretary Paulson didn't get proper
authorities within the next 48 hours,
the banking system would collapse.

227
00:16:17,720 --> 00:16:21,840
We are talking about, erm,
not a recession,

228
00:16:21,840 --> 00:16:25,320
but even beyond a depression,
just a complete stoppage.

229
00:16:25,320 --> 00:16:28,120
That was a pretty stark statement,
I mean that was

230
00:16:28,120 --> 00:16:32,240
almost a surreal event, it was so
overwhelming in its implications.

231
00:16:33,760 --> 00:16:38,600
Paulson asked for authority to buy
hundreds of billions of dollars
of toxic assets from the banks.

232
00:16:38,600 --> 00:16:44,160
It would free up the banks
to raise their own capital
and start lending again.

233
00:16:44,160 --> 00:16:47,680
Then one of the group
asked an awkward question.

234
00:16:47,680 --> 00:16:52,560
Secretary Paulson said we want
to buy these at tax payer expense.

235
00:16:52,560 --> 00:16:56,720
I said I knew that was a
terrible deal for the tax payer.

236
00:16:56,720 --> 00:16:59,440
I said, there has
to be an alternative.

237
00:16:59,440 --> 00:17:07,040
He said, what the banks need
is capital and I said, "Why not
inject capital into the bank?"

238
00:17:07,040 --> 00:17:12,560
The Congressman was suggesting the
Government buy shares in the banks,
partially nationalising them.

239
00:17:12,560 --> 00:17:17,200
Simpler, but heresy
within Bush's Republican party.

240
00:17:17,200 --> 00:17:19,600
The problem is that I believe
it's socialism,

241
00:17:19,600 --> 00:17:23,520
you know, the government's
involved, owning private property,

242
00:17:23,520 --> 00:17:25,480
owning stock here and there.

243
00:17:25,480 --> 00:17:28,640
I think it's a road to disaster,
it's not a good road.

244
00:17:28,640 --> 00:17:30,800
We've tried it in Europe,
it never works,

245
00:17:30,800 --> 00:17:34,360
it's always you go back and they
want more money from the tax payers.

246
00:17:35,880 --> 00:17:38,680
Paulson left the meeting
and announced that America

247
00:17:38,680 --> 00:17:43,920
was united and was marching
full speed ahead with the
plan to buy up toxic assets.

248
00:17:43,920 --> 00:17:46,720
Secretary of the
Treasury, Mr Paulson...

249
00:17:46,720 --> 00:17:50,360
Thank you very much, Madam Speaker.

250
00:17:50,360 --> 00:17:54,600
I think we saw the best of
the United States in the

251
00:17:54,600 --> 00:17:57,920
Speaker's office tonight.

252
00:17:57,920 --> 00:18:03,560
This country is able to come
together and do things quickly
when it needs to be

253
00:18:03,560 --> 00:18:05,720
done for the good of
the American people.

254
00:18:05,720 --> 00:18:09,400
TV REPORT: 'Action on both sides
of the Atlantic to try to end ...'

255
00:18:09,400 --> 00:18:14,080
'The US Stock Market has recorded
the biggest rise in share
prices for nearly six years...'

256
00:18:17,040 --> 00:18:22,200
The fact America was at last acting,
was enough to boost
world-wide markets.

257
00:18:22,200 --> 00:18:26,960
In London, the FTSE rose
over 400 points.

258
00:18:30,880 --> 00:18:35,920
Today, financial shares pushed the
French market is up more than 6%.

259
00:18:35,920 --> 00:18:38,840
It's because of yesterday's
announcement from the USA.

260
00:18:38,840 --> 00:18:44,840
As I see it, the market is eagerly
waiting for the bailout package

261
00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:47,440
from the USA,
which is quite substantial.

262
00:18:48,760 --> 00:18:52,080
We think that trust in the
financial system is rebuilding again

263
00:18:52,080 --> 00:18:55,360
and we can see that judged by
today's growth in the market.

264
00:18:56,440 --> 00:19:00,400
One of the challenges in crises,
and I lived through them when I

265
00:19:00,400 --> 00:19:04,600
worked at the IMF for 15 years,
is there is no right solution,

266
00:19:04,600 --> 00:19:06,160
there is no first best.

267
00:19:06,760 --> 00:19:12,400
By definition, a crisis
hits, you're not prepared,
but you've got to react.

268
00:19:21,800 --> 00:19:24,880
But it was a very bad time to
be asking Washington to be doing

269
00:19:24,880 --> 00:19:29,400
anything, let alone save the world
from an economic catastrophe.

270
00:19:29,400 --> 00:19:32,960
Elections were six weeks away.

271
00:19:32,960 --> 00:19:36,160
Getting lawmakers to agree on
a bailout bill would be hard.

272
00:19:51,200 --> 00:19:56,280
Paulson had gone to Congress
three days after Lehman collapsed.

273
00:19:56,280 --> 00:20:00,480
It was now day nine, and they were
still debating the bail-out bill.

274
00:20:00,480 --> 00:20:03,920
The price tag was 700 billion.

275
00:20:03,920 --> 00:20:07,280
And it was deeply unpopular.

276
00:20:07,280 --> 00:20:10,680
I got 3,000 calls in my office from
constituents,

277
00:20:10,680 --> 00:20:13,760
3,000 of those calls were against
the bailout, I got one call

278
00:20:13,760 --> 00:20:16,320
in favour and
that was from Hank Paulson(!)

279
00:20:16,320 --> 00:20:20,320
At this point, I do not think
the world is in desperate need

280
00:20:20,320 --> 00:20:22,960
of hearing any more
from me on this subject.

281
00:20:22,960 --> 00:20:29,000
I, therefore, waive my minutes
and recognise the ranking member.
Who's not here.

282
00:20:29,000 --> 00:20:30,960
I was with Secretary Paulson
at the hearing 

283
00:20:30,960 --> 00:20:34,680
and one of my colleagues
had to hand him a note.

284
00:20:34,680 --> 00:20:38,760
The note said that Republican
Presidential candidate, John McCain,

285
00:20:38,760 --> 00:20:42,400
had just announced he was going
to lend a hand in the crisis.

286
00:20:42,400 --> 00:20:46,200
I'll suspend my campaign
and return to Washington.

287
00:20:46,200 --> 00:20:51,040
I've spoken to Senator Obama and
informed him of my decision and

288
00:20:51,040 --> 00:20:53,360
I have asked him to join me.

289
00:20:54,880 --> 00:20:57,360
John McCain set off for
to Washington to broker

290
00:20:57,360 --> 00:21:02,760
a deal on the bail-out bill
at the White House with Barack Obama
and President Bush.

291
00:21:02,760 --> 00:21:06,760
The problem was, nobody had
actually asked him to help.

292
00:21:08,880 --> 00:21:12,120
Hank Paulson was furious.

293
00:21:12,120 --> 00:21:16,360
We really didn't want this to be
debated on the campaign trail,

294
00:21:16,360 --> 00:21:21,040
so he was, I would say, frustrated,
is a demure way to say how

295
00:21:21,040 --> 00:21:25,200
he was about the fact that this
was now entering into the election.

296
00:21:27,120 --> 00:21:32,720
McCain's intervention
would waste valuable time
and cost the world dear.

297
00:21:32,720 --> 00:21:36,080
I want to thank the leaders of the
House and the Senate for coming.

298
00:21:36,080 --> 00:21:39,560
I appreciate our presidential
candidates for being here, as well.

299
00:21:39,560 --> 00:21:46,640
We're in a serious economic crisis
in the country if we don't pass
a piece of legislation.

300
00:21:46,640 --> 00:21:51,800
Speaker Pelosi started by
saying that she was going to allow

301
00:21:51,800 --> 00:21:58,000
Senator Obama to speak for the
Democrats, and he began by speaking
and asking a few questions.

302
00:21:59,600 --> 00:22:05,080
The Republican McCain
refused to say if he supported the
plan to buy up the toxic assets.

303
00:22:05,080 --> 00:22:08,080
The Democrats goaded him for it.

304
00:22:09,600 --> 00:22:15,000
I don't recall Senator McCain making
any statements, one way or the other,

305
00:22:15,000 --> 00:22:21,280
in terms of what we were doing.
I think he was basically
keeping his powder dry.

306
00:22:21,280 --> 00:22:24,600
Finally, the president, who
had seemed somewhat distracted,

307
00:22:24,600 --> 00:22:27,800
I think realised what was happening
and said, "Meeting over".

308
00:22:29,560 --> 00:22:32,920
McCain returned to
the campaign trail.

309
00:22:32,920 --> 00:22:36,440
There would be no
agreement that week.

310
00:22:36,440 --> 00:22:38,000
It set us back significantly.

311
00:22:38,000 --> 00:22:40,000
I mean, we lost a few days.

312
00:22:41,600 --> 00:22:43,800
All of the kind of national

313
00:22:43,800 --> 00:22:49,200
parties were looking towards their
candidates, as to how to think about

314
00:22:49,200 --> 00:22:52,520
the bail-out, which made things
profoundly difficult.

315
00:22:52,520 --> 00:22:58,280
# It's the end of the world
as we know it.. #

316
00:22:58,280 --> 00:23:02,720
The US rescue plan to buy up toxic
assets was bogged down in politics.

317
00:23:02,720 --> 00:23:06,840
It had been ten days since
the collapse of Lehman.

318
00:23:06,840 --> 00:23:08,960
Stock markets were panicked.

319
00:23:08,960 --> 00:23:12,520
The Russian exchange had
three times suspended trading.

320
00:23:12,520 --> 00:23:16,560
Half a dozen European banks
were hours from insolvency.

321
00:23:16,560 --> 00:23:19,440
Ireland was in recession.

322
00:23:19,440 --> 00:23:23,360
The veneer of international unity
began to crack.

323
00:23:27,880 --> 00:23:30,840
The French President was
the first to break rank.

324
00:23:30,840 --> 00:23:36,080
He blamed the policies London
and New York had been pushing 
for decades.

325
00:23:37,240 --> 00:23:41,440
I remember very clearly the address,
because I was sitting at
the front row.

326
00:23:43,200 --> 00:23:46,120
I hadn't
read the speech before he gave it.

327
00:24:01,400 --> 00:24:03,560
I thought to myself,
that's a turning point.

328
00:24:05,560 --> 00:24:11,960
Well, we certainly felt
that something major was happening,
or was cracking or breaking up.

329
00:24:11,960 --> 00:24:18,360
And in retrospect,
it was clearly a crisis of all the
excesses that were taking place.

330
00:24:18,360 --> 00:24:24,880
Excess of the sophistication, excess
of liquidity, excess of leverage,
excess of compensation...

331
00:24:24,880 --> 00:24:26,680
Excess of greed.,
at the end of the day.

332
00:24:26,680 --> 00:24:30,920
It was the
breaking down of the doctrine.

333
00:24:33,960 --> 00:24:37,520
Britian's biggest export is banking.

334
00:24:37,520 --> 00:24:42,160
It needed, more than any other
European country, to fix the system.

335
00:24:42,160 --> 00:24:46,200
Gordon Brown went to New
York to see if the US plan

336
00:24:46,200 --> 00:24:48,920
now known as TARP, would work.

337
00:24:48,920 --> 00:24:52,400
What he found
changed the course of the crisis.

338
00:24:52,400 --> 00:24:54,040
His Excellency, Gordon Brown.

339
00:24:54,040 --> 00:24:58,400
I wanted to test in America
what analysis people had

340
00:24:58,400 --> 00:25:00,280
of the current situation.

341
00:25:00,480 --> 00:25:03,840
The American interest in what was
called the TARP scheme, would that

342
00:25:03,840 --> 00:25:07,160
be enough to deal with the
problems of the financial system?

343
00:25:08,360 --> 00:25:14,480
The UK team was coming to the
conclusion the American plan to
buy toxic assets was flawed.

344
00:25:14,480 --> 00:25:20,360
It didn't address
directly the key problem -
banks' capital was spiralling down.

345
00:25:20,360 --> 00:25:24,040
The simplest solution
was to pump in money.

346
00:25:24,040 --> 00:25:30,520
The breakfast was with investors in
global banks, as well as UK banks,

347
00:25:30,520 --> 00:25:33,800
and it was very clear that they

348
00:25:33,800 --> 00:25:39,840
shared our analysis, which was the
underlying issue was around capital

349
00:25:39,840 --> 00:25:43,840
and the question of course, then
naturally arises where the sources

350
00:25:43,840 --> 00:25:46,480
of capital are
which only left the Government.

351
00:25:50,240 --> 00:25:52,920
The next day
Gordon Brown flew to Washington.

352
00:25:52,920 --> 00:25:58,440
He asked President Bush
how America's plan would
increase capital in US banks.

353
00:25:58,440 --> 00:26:02,400
..make sure that friendship
stays strong, and I appreciate
you coming down from New York.

354
00:26:02,400 --> 00:26:07,840
What I talked to him about was
obviously the TARP scheme,
was a big scheme,

355
00:26:07,840 --> 00:26:11,880
but would it be enough and would
it actually answer the problem?

356
00:26:11,880 --> 00:26:17,280
We obviously needed whether it would
plan to do anything around capital,

357
00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:20,280
and we wanted to do that
with the President directly.

358
00:26:20,280 --> 00:26:23,920
It wasn't clear to us what
their response was going to be.

359
00:26:23,920 --> 00:26:27,640
The only source of capital
at that point was Government.

360
00:26:27,640 --> 00:26:30,080
Brown was in effect
asking the President

361
00:26:30,080 --> 00:26:34,240
if he was prepared to nationalise,
at least in part, US banks.

362
00:26:34,240 --> 00:26:37,920
What the Prime Minister wants to
know is, is the plan we've devised

363
00:26:37,920 --> 00:26:41,200
big enough to make a difference,
and is it going to be passed?

364
00:26:41,200 --> 00:26:46,560
And I told him the plan is big
enough to make a difference and I
believe it is going to be passed.

365
00:26:46,560 --> 00:26:48,120
Thank you.

366
00:26:48,120 --> 00:26:51,880
Brown left America unconvinced
by the President's assurances.

367
00:26:51,880 --> 00:26:55,920
On his flight home he was
handed a Cabinet Office paper.

368
00:26:55,920 --> 00:27:01,800
It was a confidential blueprint to
tackle the crisis - under British,
not American, leadership.

369
00:27:03,640 --> 00:27:09,880
Gordon had commissioned,
beforehand, from Number Ten
as well as the Treasury

370
00:27:09,880 --> 00:27:14,040
and the Bank of England, the FSA,
views on capitalisation,

371
00:27:14,040 --> 00:27:18,040
and that
came through in a fax,

372
00:27:18,040 --> 00:27:21,560
that was given to us
as we got on the plane.

373
00:27:21,560 --> 00:27:26,160
If we were to go ahead with a scheme
to recapitalise the banks that would
give us confidence we could deal

374
00:27:26,160 --> 00:27:31,080
with the impaired assets and then
have a funding scheme that followed
that, what would it look like?

375
00:27:31,080 --> 00:27:32,640
What would we have to do?

376
00:27:32,640 --> 00:27:37,440
It was unclear if we were going to
be followed by other countries,
it was unclear how the markets

377
00:27:37,440 --> 00:27:40,920
were going to react, it was unclear
how the public was going to react.

378
00:27:40,920 --> 00:27:46,760
By the time I came back from America
I was pretty sure, and I was talking

379
00:27:46,760 --> 00:27:51,360
to Alistair Darling of course
all the time, pretty sure
that we had to take, radical action.

380
00:27:52,880 --> 00:27:56,680
What the Prime Minister had
decided to do was unprecedented.

381
00:27:56,680 --> 00:28:00,920
By setting the UK on the path to
directly recapitalise the banks,

382
00:28:00,920 --> 00:28:06,160
he was going to break with the
United States - a massive gamble.

383
00:28:06,160 --> 00:28:09,480
We still had to hold to the
conviction that we were doing

384
00:28:09,480 --> 00:28:14,920
the right thing,
and it was...it was quite a moment.

385
00:28:14,920 --> 00:28:16,640
I don't think I'll ever forget it.

386
00:28:17,760 --> 00:28:20,520
Brown kept his decision secret.

387
00:28:20,520 --> 00:28:25,880
First, he'd let Washington vote
on its plan to buy toxic assets.

388
00:28:27,520 --> 00:28:33,400
Monday the 29th of September
would be one of the most
dramatic days in the crisis.

389
00:28:33,400 --> 00:28:37,800
The US bail-out bill was moved
to the floor of the US Congress.

390
00:28:37,800 --> 00:28:40,040
The vote was too close to call.

391
00:28:40,040 --> 00:28:43,800
The stakes for the whole world
were huge.

392
00:28:43,800 --> 00:28:47,080
Are we standing at
the edge of this abyss?

393
00:28:47,080 --> 00:28:49,480
Nobody knows.

394
00:28:49,480 --> 00:28:51,240
But maybe.

395
00:28:51,240 --> 00:28:53,960
It's very probable.

396
00:28:53,960 --> 00:28:59,040
Madam Speaker,
this bill offends my principles.

397
00:28:59,040 --> 00:29:04,120
But I'm going to vote for this bill
in order to preserve my principles,

398
00:29:04,120 --> 00:29:07,640
in order to preserve this
free enterprise system.

399
00:29:07,640 --> 00:29:10,680
This is a Herbert Hoover moment.

400
00:29:10,680 --> 00:29:15,000
He made some big mistakes
after the Great Depression,

401
00:29:15,000 --> 00:29:19,320
and we lived
those consequences for decades.

402
00:29:19,320 --> 00:29:21,880
Let's not make that mistake.

403
00:29:21,880 --> 00:29:25,400
Put yourself in the average Member
of Congress' mind at the time.

404
00:29:25,400 --> 00:29:28,040
They're up for re-election
in about a month.

405
00:29:28,040 --> 00:29:31,520
Every single one of their
constituents hates this thing.

406
00:29:31,520 --> 00:29:34,800
They think it's a 700 billion dollar
bailout of risky, greedy Wall Street

407
00:29:34,800 --> 00:29:38,320
bankers, and they're being asked
to vote for this.

408
00:29:38,320 --> 00:29:40,720
Time has expired.
The gentleman from Massachusets.

409
00:29:40,720 --> 00:29:43,120
Madam Speaker,
I yield myself...

410
00:29:43,120 --> 00:29:45,800
I never thought,
when we got to the house floor,

411
00:29:45,800 --> 00:29:47,480
that we wouldn't get the authority.

412
00:29:47,480 --> 00:29:52,000
Now is the time to act on
the free market principles
we profess to believe in.

413
00:29:52,000 --> 00:29:58,360
Let's vote down this bill.
Please, please don't betray
this nation's great history.

414
00:30:01,800 --> 00:30:05,480
On this vote the yeas are 205.

415
00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:07,520
The nays are 228.

416
00:30:07,520 --> 00:30:09,120
The motion is not adopted...

417
00:30:09,120 --> 00:30:12,480
It failed. 11 days wasted.

418
00:30:12,480 --> 00:30:14,320
Still no rescue.

419
00:30:15,320 --> 00:30:20,120
Hank Paulson said this was
his worst day in office.

420
00:30:20,120 --> 00:30:23,560
Nobody thinks about the
banking system until
there's a problem with it.

421
00:30:23,560 --> 00:30:28,120
If we had explained that a little
bit better and said that it's not
just a Wall Street problem, it's a

422
00:30:28,120 --> 00:30:34,520
credit problem and and everybody
needs credit - from students to
workers to small businesses -

423
00:30:34,520 --> 00:30:37,600
we probably would have had
a little buy-in earlier.

424
00:30:41,120 --> 00:30:44,560
It took another four
days to pass the bill.

425
00:30:46,920 --> 00:30:49,760
But by then,
the damage had been done.

426
00:30:51,440 --> 00:30:54,760
# I'm standing on a corner
with a dollar in my hand... #

427
00:30:54,760 --> 00:31:00,760
Within minutes of the "No"
vote, the stock market
crashed by a record 777 points.

428
00:31:00,760 --> 00:31:04,840
In London, RBS shares lost a
fifth of their value.

429
00:31:04,840 --> 00:31:08,160
The lending rate between banks
skyrocketed.

430
00:31:10,960 --> 00:31:15,000
It was disappointing to see that the
Congress either did not perceive

431
00:31:15,000 --> 00:31:19,400
the gravity of the situation, or to
think, "Well, Lehman Brothers'

432
00:31:19,400 --> 00:31:22,440
catastrophe was not enough -
what else is going to be needed?"

433
00:31:24,880 --> 00:31:26,840
It was a Black Monday.

434
00:31:26,840 --> 00:31:33,800
Governments stepped in to save major
banks in France and Belgium, the
Netherlands, Germany and Britain.

435
00:31:33,800 --> 00:31:37,520
And then there was
Ireland and Iceland.

436
00:31:37,520 --> 00:31:43,680
All over Europe
at that same time governments were
facing the same kind of problem

437
00:31:43,680 --> 00:31:48,360
and we didn't really know how they
were reacting and we didn't really

438
00:31:48,360 --> 00:31:50,480
know what the reaction

439
00:31:50,480 --> 00:31:54,680
to their reactions would be
and how that would then affect us.

440
00:31:55,240 --> 00:31:59,080
'The approach of the Icelandic
coastguard vessel, Valdur,

441
00:31:59,080 --> 00:32:01,440
'was observed without comment.

442
00:32:01,440 --> 00:32:04,000
'Valdur is commanded
by Captain Jarne Helgusson

443
00:32:04,000 --> 00:32:06,680
'who claimed
the very last cuttings of...'

444
00:32:06,680 --> 00:32:12,440
When Iceland fought the cod war
with Britain in the '70s,
it lived off fishing.

445
00:32:15,120 --> 00:32:17,800
But during the boom
it was transformed into

446
00:32:17,800 --> 00:32:24,600
a banking centre and grew rich,
using high interest rates as bait
to lure foreign depositors.

447
00:32:26,160 --> 00:32:30,720
With this cash they borrowed
even more from overseas.

448
00:32:30,720 --> 00:32:36,840
The Lehman collapse and the
credit freeze hit one of Iceland's
banks particularly hard.

449
00:32:36,840 --> 00:32:40,120
It was nationalised
on Monday the 29th.

450
00:32:40,120 --> 00:32:42,040
But it proved a costly move.

451
00:32:42,040 --> 00:32:47,840
Iceland's banks had debts
eight times the country's GDP.

452
00:32:47,840 --> 00:32:51,080
International depositors
didn't believe it could meet them.

453
00:32:51,080 --> 00:32:56,200
They began withdrawing money.
A run on Iceland started.

454
00:33:00,240 --> 00:33:04,920
What we thought and saw immediately
was that, most likely, our sort of

455
00:33:04,920 --> 00:33:11,080
deposit funding in the UK and in the
Netherlands would become under siege.

456
00:33:11,080 --> 00:33:15,800
We would have to be extremely
lucky if we would get
away from this unharmed.

457
00:33:19,880 --> 00:33:23,520
Like Iceland, Ireland
had been riding the boom.

458
00:33:23,520 --> 00:33:29,960
Low taxes, cheap credit
and the Euro had fuelled an Irish
building bonanza.

459
00:33:29,960 --> 00:33:34,440
But the property market crashed,
taking the banks with them.

460
00:33:35,560 --> 00:33:42,440
Ireland's finance minister was in
emergency session on the same Monday
of the bail-out vote in America,

461
00:33:42,440 --> 00:33:44,800
In the early evening I received

462
00:33:44,800 --> 00:33:48,160
a call indicating to me
that the chief executive and 

463
00:33:48,160 --> 00:33:51,680
chairman of the two leading Irish
banks, the Bank of Ireland and the

464
00:33:51,680 --> 00:33:53,640
Allied Irish Bank wished to meet us.

465
00:33:55,160 --> 00:34:02,200
The bank chiefs told him the
entire Irish banking system
was on the verge of collapse.

466
00:34:02,200 --> 00:34:04,960
We were anxious to
avoid that at all costs.

467
00:34:04,960 --> 00:34:11,600
The policy options available to us
were to immediately nationalise
an institution.

468
00:34:11,600 --> 00:34:15,280
If we immediately nationalised that
institution, the risk was that it

469
00:34:15,280 --> 00:34:19,040
could lead to a systemic collapse
of all the other institutions.

470
00:34:19,040 --> 00:34:21,520
We decided that the best
course of action was to

471
00:34:21,520 --> 00:34:26,280
guarantee the six institutions
which exclusively looked to
Ireland for their protection.

472
00:34:26,280 --> 00:34:28,720
They didn't hesitate.

473
00:34:28,720 --> 00:34:33,320
Brian Lenihan scheduled a press
conference for the next morning.

474
00:34:33,320 --> 00:34:36,560
Were liquidity to dry up
in the Irish banking system,

475
00:34:36,560 --> 00:34:42,000
in the weeks ahead, the inevitable
result would be economic
catastrophe for this country.

476
00:34:43,280 --> 00:34:46,560
He announced Ireland
would guarantee its banks.

477
00:34:46,560 --> 00:34:50,480
The principle of united
European action was rupturing.

478
00:34:50,480 --> 00:34:54,920
It was a bold move,
with far-reaching consequences.

479
00:34:54,920 --> 00:35:00,120
Anybody in the EU holding Euros
could transfer them to Ireland.

480
00:35:00,120 --> 00:35:02,680
And he didn't tell Europe
until the last minute,

481
00:35:02,680 --> 00:35:06,200
when he called his French
counterpart, Christine Legarde.

482
00:35:06,200 --> 00:35:11,200
She was the president
of the European Finance
Council at the time.

483
00:35:11,200 --> 00:35:14,840
And I felt that she was
the appropriate person on
the political side to advise,

484
00:35:14,840 --> 00:35:19,280
and so I spoke to her in French
and advised her that we were
guaranteeing the Irish banks.

485
00:35:19,280 --> 00:35:25,080
He gave me a call. It was prior to
the opening time on the stock market

486
00:35:25,080 --> 00:35:27,360
and I thought, "Oh, gosh."

487
00:35:27,360 --> 00:35:31,560
I think she said, "Oh, gosh."
She didn't seem too surprised.

488
00:35:31,560 --> 00:35:34,600
She took it very much in her stride.
Christine is like that.

489
00:35:34,600 --> 00:35:37,240
She takes things in her stride.
She's very good in that way.

490
00:35:37,240 --> 00:35:39,880
We had to very swiftly react to that,

491
00:35:39,880 --> 00:35:43,440
'and certainly I had extended
telephone conversations with

492
00:35:43,440 --> 00:35:47,600
colleagues to, you know,
sort of build up counter measures.

493
00:35:48,800 --> 00:35:53,040
The Irish announcement
also caught the UK on the hop.

494
00:35:53,040 --> 00:35:59,920
British depositors were only
guaranteed to get back £35,000
per account if a bank went bust.

495
00:35:59,920 --> 00:36:04,120
Now Ireland was offering
unlimited guarantees.

496
00:36:04,120 --> 00:36:08,480
Depositors rushed
to move money to Irish banks.

497
00:36:08,480 --> 00:36:11,640
It just would have been a lot
better if we'd known in advance

498
00:36:11,640 --> 00:36:14,920
because we'd have had proper measures
in place in the morning

499
00:36:14,920 --> 00:36:16,400
when the branches opened.

500
00:36:16,400 --> 00:36:18,360
We had to do it over
a period of days.

501
00:36:18,360 --> 00:36:20,520
But it wasn't just us
that was concerned.

502
00:36:20,520 --> 00:36:25,720
France was concerned,
Germany was concerned,
and the lesson that you draw here

503
00:36:25,720 --> 00:36:28,680
is you can't do these things
on your own - you've got to talk.

504
00:36:30,480 --> 00:36:34,640
It was 17 days since
Lehman collapsed.

505
00:36:34,640 --> 00:36:38,920
Europe was at loggerheads,
America getting nowhere.

506
00:36:38,920 --> 00:36:46,200
And - on camera at least -
Gordon Brown wasn't ready to
announce anything but platitudes.

507
00:36:46,200 --> 00:36:49,440
We are dealing with the problems
one by one that have emerged

508
00:36:49,440 --> 00:36:51,600
as a result of
the fallout from America.

509
00:36:51,600 --> 00:36:55,640
But I think everybody knows that
the foundation of your ability

510
00:36:55,640 --> 00:37:00,560
to run your lives financially
is that you have trust
in the financial institutions...

511
00:37:00,560 --> 00:37:03,800
We had to get all
the details, we had to look at
the individual banks,

512
00:37:03,800 --> 00:37:05,680
we had to look at
what was necessary.

513
00:37:05,680 --> 00:37:08,680
Of course, we were in regular touch
with the Treasury.

514
00:37:08,680 --> 00:37:13,280
We were working together.
We had to get a new plan.

515
00:37:13,280 --> 00:37:16,480
I was definitely under some pressure
from the Prime Minister

516
00:37:16,480 --> 00:37:18,000
to get it delivered on time.

517
00:37:20,680 --> 00:37:25,880
The next day, Gordon Brown's
Business Minister, Shriti Vadera,
secretly brought together a group

518
00:37:25,880 --> 00:37:29,760
of city bankers to work out
details of the British plan.

519
00:37:31,880 --> 00:37:34,080
Her office rang up
on Thursday morning.

520
00:37:34,080 --> 00:37:36,600
We were sort of
expecting a call of sorts.

521
00:37:36,600 --> 00:37:38,200
We didn't know how it would work,

522
00:37:38,200 --> 00:37:41,320
but we realised that weekend
and the next few days were crucial.

523
00:37:50,600 --> 00:37:54,840
They met at the London offices
of Standard Chartered Bank.

524
00:37:54,840 --> 00:37:58,680
None of the participants has spoken
publicly about what happened.

525
00:38:00,520 --> 00:38:05,320
That was the start of
many long days.

526
00:38:05,320 --> 00:38:08,040
We were sitting in
the Standard Chartered boardroom

527
00:38:08,040 --> 00:38:12,320
and there was lots of wine
and beer there, which never
really got touched,

528
00:38:12,320 --> 00:38:17,160
but I remember thinking
that whoever had laid it
was being quite optimistic.

529
00:38:18,120 --> 00:38:23,480
Baroness Vadera was
accompanied by one of Alistair
Darling's close advisors.

530
00:38:23,480 --> 00:38:27,000
The senior Treasury official
and I went to the meeting

531
00:38:27,000 --> 00:38:31,040
and we had already
identified the question.

532
00:38:31,040 --> 00:38:34,880
We were sitting there,
looking at one another,
hoping somebody had the answer.

533
00:38:34,880 --> 00:38:39,080
And so Shriti opened the meeting
very simply, saying that

534
00:38:39,080 --> 00:38:41,160
we needed a comprehensive solution,

535
00:38:41,160 --> 00:38:45,160
that confidence was clearly ebbing
away, we didn't have much time...

536
00:38:45,160 --> 00:38:51,040
We needed to work through how we
were going to provide a guarantee
for funding, on what terms...

537
00:38:51,040 --> 00:38:56,840
What was needed and
what the market reaction would be,
and how enforceable a plan would be.

538
00:38:59,000 --> 00:39:02,360
They finished at about
3am that first night,

539
00:39:02,360 --> 00:39:07,720
with a draft proposal
to inject funding and capital
into the UK banking sector.

540
00:39:07,720 --> 00:39:11,880
This document has
never been made public before.

541
00:39:11,880 --> 00:39:16,320
Their proposal had three measures -
buying £50 billion

542
00:39:16,320 --> 00:39:20,200
of shares in the banks
to increase their capital position.

543
00:39:20,200 --> 00:39:25,040
UK Banks had to borrow to pay
off loans, so they'd set up

544
00:39:25,040 --> 00:39:30,360
a £250 billion loan guarantee
fund to build confidence
for the credit markets.

545
00:39:30,360 --> 00:39:36,280
And the Bank of England
would put another £200 billion
into the market.

546
00:39:36,280 --> 00:39:40,560
The plan was put to the three bosses
of Britain's economy.

547
00:39:40,560 --> 00:39:42,800
Mervyn King, governor
of the Bank of England,

548
00:39:42,800 --> 00:39:45,640
obviously Alistair Darling,
as Chancellor -

549
00:39:45,640 --> 00:39:50,360
we had very, very regular meetings
to look at these problems,
and we agreed.

550
00:39:50,360 --> 00:39:53,400
We played our part
in contributing ideas

551
00:39:53,400 --> 00:39:55,840
to how that should be carried out.

552
00:39:55,840 --> 00:40:01,440
The Treasury had to be responsible
for the design of this because
we were going to stand behind it,

553
00:40:01,440 --> 00:40:06,360
and of course, ultimately,
the decision had to be mine
and the Prime Minister's.

554
00:40:07,880 --> 00:40:12,440
The plan was approved by all
three men by the end of the weekend.

555
00:40:17,880 --> 00:40:20,200
Get this. Shoot Shriti... Shoot...

556
00:40:21,240 --> 00:40:25,280
Any news about a banking bail out,
Lady Vadera? Shriti, any news?

557
00:40:25,280 --> 00:40:29,880
There was plenty of
rumour circulating, but nothing
concrete had leaked.

558
00:40:29,880 --> 00:40:34,200
We thought we were going to
have a bit more time get the banks
in and explain it to them,

559
00:40:34,200 --> 00:40:38,440
get them to sign up to it,
which we assumed would take
a little bit of time.

560
00:40:38,440 --> 00:40:41,640
And I think the idea was probably...

561
00:40:41,640 --> 00:40:45,600
There was no hard deadline,
but I think it felt like it
might take a week.

562
00:40:46,800 --> 00:40:50,360
He was wrong.
They had very little time indeed.

563
00:40:50,360 --> 00:40:53,520
The climax of the crisis
was approaching fast.

564
00:40:53,520 --> 00:41:00,280
Investors were scared by the rumours
and wanted to get their money
out of the most fragile banks.

565
00:41:01,760 --> 00:41:08,800
Two of our major banks, which had
had difficulty in obtaining funding,
could raise money only for one week,

566
00:41:08,800 --> 00:41:14,960
then only for one day, and then on
that Monday and Tuesday it was not
possible even for those two banks

567
00:41:14,960 --> 00:41:19,400
really to be confident they
could get to the end of the day.

568
00:41:19,400 --> 00:41:24,480
Those two banks were HBOS,
now part of the Lloyds group,
and Royal Bank Of Scotland,

569
00:41:24,480 --> 00:41:29,680
which had vast amounts
of toxic assets on its books.

570
00:41:29,680 --> 00:41:34,480
On Tuesday morning,
October 7th, the city advisors
were at the Treasury,

571
00:41:34,480 --> 00:41:38,240
presenting to ministers
and the Bank of England.

572
00:41:38,240 --> 00:41:43,880
We opened the presentation up
and I got a message through from
a colleague of mine,

573
00:41:43,880 --> 00:41:46,800
who said,
"I don't know where you are...

574
00:41:48,440 --> 00:41:53,120
"..but rumour has it you're
involved in some sort of scheme."

575
00:41:53,120 --> 00:41:58,320
And he said, "You should know that
the banks open very, very weakly."

576
00:41:58,320 --> 00:42:03,800
And I thought "very weakly"
meant sort of 10%, 15%, which
is a lot but it's not dramatic.

577
00:42:03,800 --> 00:42:06,200
It's been another tumultuous
morning on the markets.

578
00:42:06,200 --> 00:42:10,600
Some of Britain's biggest
banks have seen their share
prices plummet again.

579
00:42:10,600 --> 00:42:15,800
At one point, the value of shares
in the Royal Bank of Scotland was
down by more than 30%...

580
00:42:15,800 --> 00:42:20,920
At the bottom, which was about ten
o'clock, it had become 40 percent.

581
00:42:20,920 --> 00:42:23,760
I had to stop what I was saying...

582
00:42:23,760 --> 00:42:30,160
and say, I think we should know that
the stock price of Royal Bank of
Scotland was seemingly in freefall.

583
00:42:30,160 --> 00:42:32,160
Well, it was in freefall.

584
00:42:32,160 --> 00:42:35,600
At that moment, the deputy
governor of the Bank of England,

585
00:42:35,600 --> 00:42:39,800
who was attending the briefing at
the Treasury, also got a phone call.

586
00:42:39,800 --> 00:42:45,760
Could I come back with Andrew Bailey,
the director of banking at the bank

587
00:42:45,760 --> 00:42:48,880
and could I help sort that out?

588
00:42:48,880 --> 00:42:50,560
And at that time

589
00:42:50,560 --> 00:42:53,480
the people we were
presenting to got up and left.

590
00:42:53,480 --> 00:43:00,080
As usual in this crisis,
attention in the media was on the
violent movements in share price.

591
00:43:00,080 --> 00:43:05,840
But behind the scenes, the real
worry was that big depositors in RBS

592
00:43:05,840 --> 00:43:09,240
would pull out their money
and the bank would become insolvent.

593
00:43:11,640 --> 00:43:16,040
In that situation
the most important thing is
whether RBS can fund itself,

594
00:43:16,040 --> 00:43:19,240
and we just had to hold our nerve.

595
00:43:19,240 --> 00:43:23,800
I spoke to the then chairman of RBS
during the course of the morning,

596
00:43:23,800 --> 00:43:27,600
and I said it was important
that they had to keep going
throughout that day.

597
00:43:29,520 --> 00:43:36,200
RBS, one of the ten
biggest banks in the world,
was running out of US dollars.

598
00:43:36,200 --> 00:43:39,960
It was touch and go if
it would be bankrupt before morning.

599
00:43:39,960 --> 00:43:44,000
We know Royal Bank of Scotland
was on the verge.

600
00:43:44,000 --> 00:43:48,600
We know that other banks in
other countries were facing ruin.

601
00:43:48,600 --> 00:43:52,000
Individuals would not have had
access to the money in that bank -

602
00:43:52,000 --> 00:43:54,080
their deposits would
have been frozen.

603
00:43:54,080 --> 00:43:59,200
The accounts would have not been
there for salaries to be paid into,

604
00:43:59,200 --> 00:44:01,760
so many people would not
have been paid their salary.

605
00:44:01,760 --> 00:44:06,600
In turn, they wouldn't have been
able to pay bills to businesses,
so the businesses would have found

606
00:44:06,600 --> 00:44:10,200
that their flow of payments
would have come to an end.

607
00:44:10,200 --> 00:44:15,920
I was in no doubt that the burden
on our shoulders, that the gravity
of the task we faced,

608
00:44:15,920 --> 00:44:20,640
and it is probably
the worst situation, as I say,
we've faced in peacetime.

609
00:44:22,160 --> 00:44:25,760
The Government didn't need
to imagine what might happen.

610
00:44:27,280 --> 00:44:29,960
It could just look
to the North Atlantic.

611
00:44:29,960 --> 00:44:36,120
That day, the Icelandic boom
finished its crash into ruin.

612
00:44:36,120 --> 00:44:39,120
The government there
declared a national emergency.

613
00:44:39,120 --> 00:44:43,520
New laws were rushed through
to protect personal savings
and domestic banking.

614
00:44:43,520 --> 00:44:50,080
The shops stayed open, but
the country was technically bust.

615
00:44:50,080 --> 00:44:56,600
The collapse of Lehman Brothers had
set in motion events that brought
a sovereign state to its knees.

616
00:44:56,600 --> 00:44:59,280
I think it was
the only option available.

617
00:44:59,280 --> 00:45:03,080
If we had gone any other way then
we would, I think, have faced

618
00:45:03,080 --> 00:45:05,200
the banks being closed

619
00:45:05,200 --> 00:45:09,720
and then we would probably have
had general panic

620
00:45:09,720 --> 00:45:14,200
and...maybe riots on our hands.

621
00:45:17,840 --> 00:45:19,720
TRANSLATION: Fellow Icelanders,

622
00:45:19,720 --> 00:45:23,280
I have requested the opportunity
to address you at this time

623
00:45:23,280 --> 00:45:27,800
when the Icelandic nation
faces major difficulties.

624
00:45:27,800 --> 00:45:32,160
The entire world is experiencing
a major economic crisis which can be

625
00:45:32,160 --> 00:45:38,200
likened in its effects on
the world's banking systems to
an economic natural disaster.

626
00:45:38,200 --> 00:45:43,480
I was in the parliament
and I heard it in the parliament
and obviously it was quite

627
00:45:43,480 --> 00:45:48,600
a dramatic moment and I think
everybody realised that the events

628
00:45:48,600 --> 00:45:52,520
that we were experiencing
were historic events.

629
00:45:52,520 --> 00:45:56,680
And that we really didn't know
what they would lead to.

630
00:45:57,840 --> 00:46:00,440
TRANSLATION: May God save Iceland.

631
00:46:02,640 --> 00:46:06,560
Back in London, throughout
that day and into the evening,

632
00:46:06,560 --> 00:46:12,920
officials at the Treasury,
the FSA and the Bank of England
nervously watched over RBS.

633
00:46:12,920 --> 00:46:15,760
It was a tremendous struggle,

634
00:46:15,760 --> 00:46:20,400
hour by hour,
to keep enough funding coming in.

635
00:46:20,400 --> 00:46:22,960
We only really knew by...

636
00:46:22,960 --> 00:46:26,960
probably about
seven o'clock at night,

637
00:46:26,960 --> 00:46:31,440
that everyone was going to
get through to the next day.

638
00:46:33,080 --> 00:46:37,840
Disaster had been averted,
but only till the markets
opened the next morning.

639
00:46:37,840 --> 00:46:41,280
The team at the Treasury
would not leave that night.

640
00:46:41,280 --> 00:46:44,760
It would have been nice to announce
every last detail of the plan.

641
00:46:44,760 --> 00:46:47,720
I had to announce first thing
on the Wednesday morning,

642
00:46:47,720 --> 00:46:51,040
"In principle, this is what the
British Government intends to do."

643
00:46:51,040 --> 00:46:55,840
They'd announce all big UK banks
would increase their capital.

644
00:46:55,840 --> 00:46:59,800
For HBOS and RBS
that meant nationalisation.

645
00:46:59,800 --> 00:47:02,160
Time to call in the bankers.

646
00:47:02,160 --> 00:47:06,560
It was strange. Everyone knew
that they would be expected
at the Treasury that night,

647
00:47:06,560 --> 00:47:10,520
because people were rung
and five minutes later they
popped in through the door,

648
00:47:10,520 --> 00:47:12,800
and I don't
think they all live in Whitehall.

649
00:47:12,800 --> 00:47:15,640
We got the banks in and told them
what we were going to do.

650
00:47:15,640 --> 00:47:18,040
I made it clear that there
was no choice in the matter.

651
00:47:19,560 --> 00:47:25,680
The initial reaction was as you
would expect - reasonably defensive,

652
00:47:25,680 --> 00:47:29,440
and the Chancellor was...charming

653
00:47:29,440 --> 00:47:32,960
in his resolution that
something would have to be agreed.

654
00:47:32,960 --> 00:47:36,120
I said,
"This is what we're going to do,"

655
00:47:36,120 --> 00:47:38,440
you know, "there's nothing else.

656
00:47:38,440 --> 00:47:40,800
"You really have to
concentrate on that."

657
00:47:40,800 --> 00:47:46,920
The banks that urgently needed
Government money were HBOS and RBS.

658
00:47:46,920 --> 00:47:52,280
But for the plan to work,
all the big UK banks needed
to agree to take part.

659
00:47:52,280 --> 00:47:57,040
A message of "The British banking
system is resilient, it is strong,

660
00:47:57,040 --> 00:47:59,480
"we the government will do
whatever it takes

661
00:47:59,480 --> 00:48:04,800
"to ensure that it can cope with
the pressures being placed on it."

662
00:48:04,800 --> 00:48:10,320
RBS boss Sir Fred Goodwin reportedly
denied he needed Government capital,

663
00:48:10,320 --> 00:48:14,960
claiming RBS just had a liquidity
or cash flow shortage.

664
00:48:14,960 --> 00:48:16,880
"I don't have a capital problem.

665
00:48:16,880 --> 00:48:18,960
"I have a liquidity problem."

666
00:48:18,960 --> 00:48:22,880
After it was said, the room
went quite quiet for a while

667
00:48:22,880 --> 00:48:26,240
and one of the other
chief executives said,

668
00:48:26,240 --> 00:48:29,080
"Everyone knows it's your problem."

669
00:48:30,600 --> 00:48:34,160
Sir Fred declined to be interviewed
but he said it is not true

670
00:48:34,160 --> 00:48:37,520
he did not understand there
was a capital issue.

671
00:48:37,520 --> 00:48:40,960
He believed the immediate issue
was liquidity.

672
00:48:40,960 --> 00:48:44,840
The bigger long-term issue
was capital.

673
00:48:44,840 --> 00:48:49,360
The RBS view was it didn't have
a capital problem, whereas
it most certainly did.

674
00:48:49,360 --> 00:48:51,680
That's why we own 70% of it now.

675
00:48:51,680 --> 00:48:59,520
Goodwin said he was "particularly
upset at the suggestion there was
some dispute at the meeting."

676
00:48:59,520 --> 00:49:04,720
One of the lessons that
we need to draw from this is
the first line of defence

677
00:49:04,720 --> 00:49:10,520
is having people sitting in a bank
boardroom that understand what is
going on in their own business.

678
00:49:10,520 --> 00:49:13,320
NEWSREADERS: 'Is this a new dawn
for our troubled banks...

679
00:49:13,320 --> 00:49:15,440
'A dramatic morning -
the final chapter...

680
00:49:15,440 --> 00:49:18,600
'The Chancellor, Alistair Darling,
is due to give details...'

681
00:49:18,600 --> 00:49:22,400
The cameras were out
early the next morning.

682
00:49:22,400 --> 00:49:26,080
Everybody knew this was
a make-or-break moment
for the country -

683
00:49:26,080 --> 00:49:28,880
possibly the world.

684
00:49:28,880 --> 00:49:33,200
The Bank of England quietly
prepared to loan RBS and HBOS

685
00:49:33,200 --> 00:49:37,240
enough cash to keep them going
to the end of the week.

686
00:49:37,240 --> 00:49:44,600
And the Chancellor
and the Prime Minister prepared
to announce their plan.

687
00:49:44,600 --> 00:49:50,440
When Gordon and Alistair stood up
and made the announcement
on the Wednesday morning,

688
00:49:50,440 --> 00:49:54,840
for me was the scariest moment,
because at that point,

689
00:49:54,840 --> 00:49:58,960
we had no idea who was
going to follow, no idea what
the markets were going to think,

690
00:49:58,960 --> 00:50:03,760
no idea what the public
was going to think, no idea if it
would really boost confidence...

691
00:50:03,760 --> 00:50:07,320
The problems that
started in America, these
are also global problems -

692
00:50:07,320 --> 00:50:09,280
global action is required.

693
00:50:09,280 --> 00:50:11,680
This is a long haul

694
00:50:11,680 --> 00:50:17,240
and we have invited other European
countries to consider proposals
we have put to them this morning.

695
00:50:17,240 --> 00:50:22,280
The day that we announced
the recapitalisation of
the British banking system,

696
00:50:22,280 --> 00:50:28,000
I was hoping that the rest of the
world, at least the major countries
in the world, would follow.

697
00:50:28,000 --> 00:50:32,560
We hadn't yet persuaded
other countries that it was
a necessary thing to do.

698
00:50:32,560 --> 00:50:35,160
So it was a very
difficult day for us.

699
00:50:36,800 --> 00:50:41,080
We were putting up £50 billion
of taxpayers' money.

700
00:50:41,080 --> 00:50:46,960
Nobody had ever done that before,
nobody had ever talked in
these sort of figures before.

701
00:50:46,960 --> 00:50:52,800
It could have been an initiative that
went entirely wrong because no other
country was prepared to support us.

702
00:50:55,640 --> 00:50:59,920
For the plan to work, they needed
America and Europe to sign up.

703
00:50:59,920 --> 00:51:03,560
Brown set off for Paris to convince
the Eurozone countries...

704
00:51:05,480 --> 00:51:09,960
..while Alistair Darling and
Mervyn King went to Washington
to sell it to a gathering

705
00:51:09,960 --> 00:51:14,920
of the International Monetary Fund,
and the G7's finance ministers.

706
00:51:16,480 --> 00:51:20,840
This wasn't the normal IMF meetings,
where you meet for a couple of days

707
00:51:20,840 --> 00:51:23,800
and you produce a ten-page communique
and all go home again.

708
00:51:25,360 --> 00:51:29,400
There was, in my experience
for the first time at
international meetings,

709
00:51:29,400 --> 00:51:34,480
a sense that the collective need
outweighed the interests of
any individual country.

710
00:51:35,440 --> 00:51:39,600
One of the finance ministers in
particular haunted the proceedings -

711
00:51:39,600 --> 00:51:44,320
a warning to the others of what
fate awaited them if they failed.

712
00:51:44,320 --> 00:51:49,040
Iceland was bankrupt -
a victim of its banks.

713
00:51:49,040 --> 00:51:53,000
I don't think I ever left Iceland

714
00:51:53,000 --> 00:51:58,280
with as much money as I did at
that time, because I didn't know,

715
00:51:58,280 --> 00:52:03,280
when I would be checking out of
the hotel, whether my credit card
would be working at all.

716
00:52:03,280 --> 00:52:08,400
Country after country
resembled deer stuck in headlights.

717
00:52:08,400 --> 00:52:10,120
They were paralysed.

718
00:52:10,120 --> 00:52:17,200
Financial institutions, banks,
bankers, traders, were at a loss.

719
00:52:17,200 --> 00:52:21,160
And they were sort of not only
holding out their hand but also,

720
00:52:21,160 --> 00:52:24,080
you know, turning to us to say,
"What are we going to do?

721
00:52:24,080 --> 00:52:25,240
"We need help."

722
00:52:26,440 --> 00:52:31,120
The UK Chancellor had a chance
to have a word in the right ears.

723
00:52:32,560 --> 00:52:34,920
I had a long conversation
with Hank Paulson.

724
00:52:34,920 --> 00:52:38,240
He knew that the same thing was
happening in the United States.

725
00:52:38,240 --> 00:52:42,040
So I think there was a consciousness
that this was a case where

726
00:52:42,040 --> 00:52:45,760
actually, internationally,
you can make a difference.

727
00:52:45,760 --> 00:52:49,240
It wasn't like
the UK sent capital injections

728
00:52:49,240 --> 00:52:52,480
and we looked at that and said,
"Oh, boy, we never thought of that.

729
00:52:52,480 --> 00:52:56,200
"It's going so well there,
we never thought of it,
we'd better go do it."

730
00:52:56,200 --> 00:52:59,120
I mean, from the very beginning
it was one of the options.

731
00:52:59,120 --> 00:53:03,480
Britain's audacious gambit
to infuse banks with taxpayer money

732
00:53:03,480 --> 00:53:08,200
and guarantee loans put America
in an impossible position.

733
00:53:08,200 --> 00:53:13,840
London now had a competitive
advantage over its New York rival.

734
00:53:13,840 --> 00:53:17,200
It certainly had an impact
on what we were doing,

735
00:53:17,200 --> 00:53:20,240
because if the UK authorities
were going to

736
00:53:20,240 --> 00:53:27,800
do a broad equity investment in their
banks and probably, more importantly,
do a broad liability guarantee

737
00:53:27,800 --> 00:53:33,520
from the Government, that would
have a very profound impact on
the US banking institutions.

738
00:53:33,520 --> 00:53:39,600
Today's actions are not what we ever
wanted to do but today's actions

739
00:53:39,600 --> 00:53:45,280
are what we must do to restore
confidence in our financial system.

740
00:53:45,280 --> 00:53:50,560
Today I'm announcing that the
Treasury will purchase equity stakes

741
00:53:50,560 --> 00:53:53,560
in a wide variety
of banks and thrifts.

742
00:53:55,560 --> 00:53:59,880
The UK had manoeuvred America
into following its plan.

743
00:53:59,880 --> 00:54:03,440
The US diverted the money allocated
for buying toxic assets

744
00:54:03,440 --> 00:54:09,600
and instead bought shares
in its banks and set up a scheme
to guarantee bank loans.

745
00:54:09,600 --> 00:54:12,840
The Eurozone states did the same.

746
00:54:12,840 --> 00:54:16,040
Those two - the capital injections
and the loan guarantees -

747
00:54:16,040 --> 00:54:19,080
were really the keys to
stabilising the financial system.

748
00:54:19,080 --> 00:54:24,080
It was very effective, because
this was the clearest indication
that we can make

749
00:54:24,080 --> 00:54:27,800
that the government
was going to stand behind
the institutions in the US.

750
00:54:30,160 --> 00:54:35,040
In the weeks afterwards,
matters clearly improved
and the panic was over.

751
00:54:35,040 --> 00:54:37,600
Of course, it did not mean
that the problems were over.

752
00:54:37,600 --> 00:54:40,280
Had we not had that
British announcement,

753
00:54:40,280 --> 00:54:43,680
we may be a very different place
today - a much worse place today.

754
00:54:59,280 --> 00:55:05,320
By the end of the year,
policy makers were confident
the cash machines would stay open.

755
00:55:07,120 --> 00:55:11,840
But even that could not prevent
the first great recession
in the age of globalisation.

756
00:55:14,880 --> 00:55:20,960
In Britain,
three quarters of a million jobs
have gone in the last year alone.

757
00:55:20,960 --> 00:55:24,640
The recession has touched
almost every country.

758
00:55:25,640 --> 00:55:32,720
I don't think there is anything
comparable to that unless you go
back to 1914 or the 19th century,

759
00:55:32,720 --> 00:55:37,600
and I think the global consequences
there were probably less than
we saw last autumn.

760
00:55:37,600 --> 00:55:43,680
TRANSLATION: I think the fault
lies with the rich countries. Why?

761
00:55:43,680 --> 00:55:48,360
Because they believed
for decades the market by itself
could resolve all problems.

762
00:55:48,360 --> 00:55:51,520
So when the market proved to be
fragile, incompetent,

763
00:55:51,520 --> 00:55:56,200
then the states started to see that
they had to act, and act decisively.

764
00:55:57,880 --> 00:56:02,040
NEWSREADERS: '..The stock of national
debt is going to keep on rising...

765
00:56:02,040 --> 00:56:05,880
'..for a £175 billion
budget deficit...

766
00:56:05,880 --> 00:56:11,000
'..involves unprecedented levels of
debt, tax increases and a squeeze
on public spending...'

767
00:56:11,000 --> 00:56:13,120
You belong in jail!
Jail! You criminal!

768
00:56:13,120 --> 00:56:16,440
The crash was decades in the making.

769
00:56:16,440 --> 00:56:19,040
The final cost
will not be known for years.

770
00:56:19,040 --> 00:56:23,120
Since the collapse
of Lehman Brothers, governments
have spent or pledged

771
00:56:23,120 --> 00:56:26,440
at least six trillion dollars
to fight the crisis.

772
00:56:26,440 --> 00:56:31,200
The Treasury says UK national debt
could rise by 20% to around

773
00:56:31,200 --> 00:56:37,880
£1 trillion in five years -
equivalent to £16,000 per person.

774
00:56:37,880 --> 00:56:43,040
However, its investment in the banks
could eventually turn a profit.

775
00:56:43,040 --> 00:56:48,920
Even right up until September,
most of these big banks basically
were pretty disdainful of Government.

776
00:56:48,920 --> 00:56:53,000
What's blindingly obvious is they
are certainly global institutions

777
00:56:53,000 --> 00:56:57,280
when things are going well,
but they become very, very local
when things go badly.

778
00:56:57,280 --> 00:57:01,400
And then they turn up at the front
door of the Treasury saying,
"Could you help, please?"

779
00:57:03,000 --> 00:57:09,400
The world's 20 biggest economies
all now profess the need
for stricter regulation.

780
00:57:09,400 --> 00:57:15,880
But, in the four times they've met
since the fall of Lehman, reaching
consensus has been difficult.

781
00:57:15,880 --> 00:57:18,480
If we wait until after the fact,

782
00:57:18,480 --> 00:57:23,960
the appetite for better and
appropriate regulation will be gone.

783
00:57:23,960 --> 00:57:28,320
And everybody will be back
to business as usual,

784
00:57:28,320 --> 00:57:31,840
and we run the risk
of our taxpayers saying,

785
00:57:31,840 --> 00:57:36,000
"Well, we're paying
all this money, but what's in it
for us at the end of the day?"

786
00:57:36,000 --> 00:57:38,520
Aren't you promising a better world?

787
00:57:38,520 --> 00:57:44,240
The Lehman collapse shattered
assumptions built up over decades

788
00:57:44,240 --> 00:57:46,760
that modern finance eliminated risk,

789
00:57:46,760 --> 00:57:54,560
that asset prices would only rise,
and the market operates best
when left alone.

790
00:57:54,560 --> 00:58:00,760
And perhaps biggest of all,
the collapse of Lehman shattered the
illusion that we can ignore history.

791
00:58:02,280 --> 00:58:05,160
There's no new paradigm here at all.

792
00:58:05,160 --> 00:58:09,400
This is something we've seen
on many occasions over
several hundred years.

793
00:58:09,400 --> 00:58:14,120
But the fact that we've seen it
in the past and not been able
to improve things is a worry.

794
00:58:14,120 --> 00:58:17,520
This is one of a long series
of financial crises.

795
00:58:17,520 --> 00:58:22,080
Its been the biggest one, perhaps
ever, but it's come out of almost

796
00:58:22,080 --> 00:58:25,920
the same sort of problems
that we've seen in the past.

797
00:58:25,920 --> 00:58:30,520
People who think
the world has changed, I'm afraid,
have not read history.

798
00:58:34,000 --> 00:58:36,800
From the south sea bubble
to the dot com boom,

799
00:58:36,800 --> 00:58:44,800
from 1929 to 2008,
every crash is a story of its time.

800
00:58:44,800 --> 00:58:51,640
But they have all shared a common
theme - a reckless love of money.

801
00:59:13,120 --> 00:59:16,720
Subtitles by Red Bee Media Ltd

802
00:59:16,720 --> 00:59:20,640
E-mail subtitling@bbc.co.uk

